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The Merida Initiative: An Effective 
Way of Reducing Violence in Mexico?
 Sabrina Abu-Hamdeh
In recent decades, Central America, the Caribbean, and Mexico have had 
the dubious honor of being key players in the global drug market. Today, 
South America is the lone producer of cocaine for the world. Mexico and 
Colombia provide the United States with its primary source of opiates 
and play central roles in the marijuana trade and the foreign production 
of methamphetamines.1 The main pathway for illegal drugs to enter the 
United States is the Central America-Mexico corridor, where it is estimated 
that ninety percent of all the cocaine entering the United States arrives. 
As a result, the Latin American drug trade is big business: Colombian 
and Mexican drug trafficking organizations make an estimated $18 to $39 
billion annually in wholesale drug profits.2 In 2008, the National Drug 
Intelligence Center reported that Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
are the “greatest organized crime threat” to the United States today, due 
to the increased distribution and transportation networks Mexican cartels 
have put in place to meet US need.3 
 After the inauguration of Mexican President Felipe Calderon in 
2006, and his subsequent pledge to battle corruption and drug trafficking, 
drug violence surged in areas dominated by the most prominent drug 
organizations. The death toll rose as these groups fought each other and 
the Mexican government for coveted control of lucrative drug routes. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime released a report stating 
that, though crime rates and homicides decreased worldwide, homicides 
increased in Latin America, Mexico and the Caribbean from 19.9 per 
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100,000 in 2003 to 32.6 per 100,000 in 2008.4 According to recent studies, 
income inequality, political instability and crime have all contributed 
to the increases in violence, but the major factor is the drug trade. Exact 
numbers of drug-related deaths are disputed, but according to the Trans-
Border Institute at the University of California, San Diego, there were 
2,120 Mexican cartel-related homicides in 2006; 2,280 in 2007; 5,153 in 2008; 
6,587 in 2009; and already the highest number yet in 2010 with 5,775. Since 
2007, shortly after President Calderon’s declaration of a war on drugs, an 
estimated 28,228 drug trade related deaths have been reported.5
 Increased anxiety over the escalating violence and increased drug 
trafficking between US border states and northern Mexico led US lawmakers 
to create anti-drug assistance programs to lessen drug-related violence 
and drug trafficking into the United States. These programs met with little 
success as increased internal corruption, ever more powerful drug cartels, 
and increased poverty plagued Mexico. With relations continuing to cool 
between the United States and Mexico, President Calderon extended an 
olive branch in 2007 and requested the help of the United States with 
counterdrug efforts and assistance.6 He also pointedly remarked on the 
United States’ role as a major consumer of Mexican drugs when he stated 
at the Merida Conference, “While there is no reduction in demand in your 
territory, it will be very difficult to reduce the supply in ours.”7 
In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the 
Merida Initiative, a $1.4 billion proposal for US assistance in Mexico and 
Central America’s drug war for FY 2008-FY 2010.8 For the 2008 fiscal year, 
Congress allocated $400 million for Mexico and $65 million for Central 
America. This marked a shift in US foreign drug policy, as until this time 
Colombia had been the main recipient of US aid, not Mexico. According to 
the US Department of State, Colombia received $600 million for FY 2006, 
while Mexico received approximately $40 million.9 As the US enters its 
fourth year of Merida Initiative implementation, it is important to assess 
whether or not it has been a successful policy. The intention of the United 
States and Mexico was to reduce the drug trafficking problem, cartel 
influence, and associated violence and corruption, while restoring order 
to much of Mexico through implementation of the initiative. This paper 
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will address the viability of the Merida Initiative as an effective policy for 
reducing continued drug-related violence and homicide in Mexico.
liTerATure review
Though extensive literature surrounds the Merida Initiative, the focus 
of this analysis will be three aspects of the program: the background of 
the proposal, the implementation and accountability of the program, and 
critiques of the program as a counter-drug policy. 
The Merida Initiative was intensely debated in Congress; lawmakers 
were hesitant to pass an aid proposal in light of the Mexican history of 
government corruption. Proponents of the initiative stressed that equipment 
and training, rather than direct cash transfers, would be offered to Mexico 
in an effort to curtail potential corruption.10 The goal of the proposal was 
to maximize the effectiveness of already existing programs to curb drug, 
human, and weapons trafficking through four different types of funding: 
counternarcotics/counterterrorism/border security; public security/law 
enforcement; institution building; and rule of law and program support. At 
its inception, the main objectives of the Merida Initiative were to: 1) break 
the power and impunity of criminal organizations; 2) strengthen border, 
air and maritime controls; 3) improve the capacity of justice systems in the 
region; and 4) curtail gang activity and diminish local drug demand.11 
No additional funding for US anti-drug efforts was appropriated in 
the initiative, though the document cited several US counterdrug programs 
already in place.12 The result of both Senate and House of Representatives 
amendments to the proposed initiative was approval of $400 million for 
Mexico and $65 million for Central America, the Dominican Republic and 
Haiti in 2008, and $300 million for Mexico and $110 for Central America, 
the Dominican Republic and Haiti for 2009.13 For FY 2010, $210.9 million 
was allotted to Mexico due to additional appropriations given to Mexico 
in FY 2009 in supplemental funding. This money was carried forward into 
the next year.14 The final year of the initiative was to be 2010, and it was 
intended that successor programs—including post-Merida support to 
Mexico, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), and 
the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)—would take up where the 
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Merida Initiative had left off. 
The process of procuring funding from Congress for the first year 
of the program was ultimately easier than service delivery itself. Since 
the initiative stipulated no cash transfers or money disbursement to the 
recipient countries, it fell to the State Department and other government 
agencies to facilitate service delivery through new and existing programs 
in Mexico. On July 10, 2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
released a report outlining the success of disbursement of the Merida 
funds allocated to Mexico. The report found that, “as of March 31, 2010, 46 
percent of Merida funds for fiscal years 2008 to 2010 had been obligated, 
and approximately 9 percent had been expended.”15 US agencies had 
delivered the major equipment stipulated in the initiative, including five 
Bell helicopters, X-ray inspection devices, law enforcement canines, and 
training for more than 4,000 police officers to the Mexican government. 
These positive findings, however, were limited as the report also found 
that an insufficient number of available staff to administer programs 
and ensure seamless equipment delivery, slow negotiations and contract 
disbursement, changes in governments and funding availability all 
hampered implementation of the Merida Initiative. The GAO had first 
reported problems with service delivery process in December 2009, at 
the behest of Congress, whose concern over the implementation of the 
Initiative was mounting.16 Since the release of the original GAO report, the 
pace of service delivery has increased, as noted in the updated July 2010 
report.
In assessing the Merida Initiative, the GAO found that its strategic 
documents were missing important elements necessary for accountability, 
and in many cases, for the success of the program. It found that performance 
measures indicating progress had not been built into program documents. 
No timelines were set as gauges of success, and equipment and training was 
provided without such measures of accountability in place.17 In response to 
these findings, the GAO recommended that outcome performance measures 
such as timelines or other indicators of program success be included in 
Merida Initiative strategy to ensure more efficient service delivery. After 
initial arguments by the Department of State regarding the GAO’s heavy 
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use of “expended funds” as the primary measure of performance, it agreed 
with the recommendations put forth by the GAO.18 
 Beyond issues of policy implementation, there remains the question 
of the Merida Initiative’s effectiveness as a drug control policy. Modeled in 
part on Plan Colombia, it was touted as the answer to the rising international 
drug problem that had seemingly been reduced in Colombia by the Plan. 
Unfortunately, according to a GAO report released in 2008, the success of 
Plan Colombia as a drug reduction plan was not found to be entirely true, 
though as a security program for Colombia it was successful. The goal of 
Plan Colombia was to reduce drug cultivation, processing and distribution 
by fifty percent between FY 2000 and FY 2006. By 2006, heroine production 
had been reduced by 15 percent, but coca cultivation had increased 
by fifteen percent and distribution had increased by four percent.19 The 
funding emphasis of Plan Colombia was on military aid with $4.9 billion 
allocated to military assistance and only $1.3 billion for justice, social and 
economic programs that included alternative development programs for 
displaced drug workers.20 The GAO ultimately recommended a more 
integrated approach for the plan’s programs to facilitate a more seamless 
transition to Colombian control. Additionally, as in the case of the Merida 
report, it recommended tangible performance measures of the program to 
ensure satisfactory outcomes and self sustaining alternative development 
programs. The GAO emphasized a report issued by the US Embassy in 
Bogota, which warned that any program gains would be temporary until 
a stable government not prone to manipulation could be established. The 
Merida Initiative has followed a trajectory similar to that of Plan Colombia 
during its short duration, as its initial funding was focused on military aid. 
Additionally, the ideology underlying the Merida Initiative 
has been questioned. While on paper, the Merida Initiative appeared 
quite clear in its intentions, according to Diana Villiers Negroponte, the 
allocation of Merida Initiative funds suggested that the principal interest of 
the United States was in counternarcotics and counterterrorism.21 Villiers 
Negroponte questions the way in which the Merida Initiative addressed 
the more contemporary issues of organized crime and cartels prevalent 
in Mexico. She did, however, applaud the Merida Initiative drafters’ 
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recognition of the need for the use of more advanced technology in judicial 
and police situations and the need for a grassroots approach to program 
implementation, because a top-down approach can be alienating, not 
unlike the gang mentality to which  many people are accustomed.22 The 
Merida Initiative’s shortcomings highlight the illegal weapons flow into 
Mexico from the United States—something Villiers Negroponte finds as an 
essential part of the drug-related violence in Mexico. No Merida funding 
was allocated toward domestic policy.
 George Grayson discusses mounting drug violence, cartel power 
and recent attempts (including the Merida Initiative) by President 
Felipe Calderon to battle the seemingly unstoppable drug trafficking 
organizations, and whether or not Mexico can overcome such obstacles.23 
In order for Mexico not to become a “failed state” as Grayson suggests is 
possible, Calderon must take control of Mexico back from the drug cartels 
through several strategies implemented concurrently. He recommends 
continuing the war on drugs while exploring other alternatives, such as 
legalizing certain drugs in a tradeoff for halted drug-related violence in a 
type of modus vivendi. At the same time, he calls for focus on the demand 
side, through increased education and treatment in the United States and 
Mexico. Grayson suggests that the possibility of decriminalization of certain 
narcotics—such as marijuana—in the US could help lessen demand from 
Mexico and has stated that, “the least bad policy is to legalize drugs.”24 
Policy AnAlySiS
The Merida Initiative came at an important moment for both the United 
States and Mexico. It signified a much needed collaboration and acceptance 
between both countries, by the acknowledgment of their mutual 
shortcomings and their pledge to aid one another. Both countries realized 
that the futures of their societies were tied, and a significant yet unintended 
consequence of the Initiative has been to improve relations between the 
governments of the United States and Mexico. The first objective of the 
initiative was to reduce drug violence and the second was to reduce drug 
trafficking into the United States by aiding the Mexican government’s fight 
with the drug cartels. An indirect goal of the Merida Initiative was to lessen 
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the demand for drugs in the United States through minimized supply. The 
unfortunate truth is that neither goal of the initiative has yet been successful. 
There are multiple reasons, which include flawed implementation yielding 
limited positive outcomes; the short duration and the small scope of the 
aid program; the limited effects the policy has on domestic drug policy 
and demand reduction; and the mounting drug-related violence prevalent 
in Mexico. 
A Carnevale Associates study of US drug policy found that 
consumption from 2002 to 2008 had not changed and remains at eight 
percent of Americans aged twelve and older.25 It also showed that, though 
consumption has remained the same, federal spending for supply reduction 
rose by sixty-four percent whereas spending on demand reduction only rose 
by nine percent. In light of these bleak statistics, the Obama administration 
needs to assess its drug policy and decide the future of the Merida Initiative.
Various policy alternatives exist for the Merida Initiative at this 
juncture. This paper will address the three most plausible options in turn, 
and review the effectiveness of each policy within the established criteria. 
The first option is to abandon the program by allowing funding to expire, 
as it was originally allocated through FY 2010 and has been extended until 
FY 2011. The second option is to continue with the Obama administration’s 
approach to the Merida Initiative, called “Beyond Merida.” This policy 
embodies the Merida Initiative’s original goals, but integrates a “shared 
responsibility” approach to drug control and a larger focus on institution 
building rather than military spending. The third option is a new approach 
that integrates aspects of President Obama’s “Beyond Merida” approach, 
but focuses more on domestic drug and weapons policy as means of 
lessening demand, and institution building and government support as 
means of lessening the supply.
The criteria used to determine the best policy incorporates the 
basic economic princples of supply and demand. The theory of supply and 
demand is fundamental in explaining market economies and most societal 
outcomes. The problem of drug violence in Mexico can be attributed to 
heightened demand that has fueled a larger supply. A successful policy 
would lessen supply through decreased drug production and cross border 
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trafficking. For this to happen, there must be decreased demand—notably, 
within the United States. The desired outcome is a reduction in violence in 
Mexico from drug-related activities and a lessened supply of illegal drugs. 
Abandoning the Merida Initiative would be an easy solution, since 
the program’s implementation has caused much concern in Congress and 
many headaches in the State Department. The feasibility of successfully 
implementing programs in Mexico and providing enough military 
assistance and training to have an impact has proven daunting for the 
State Department, with so many agencies to coordinate and contracts to 
negotiate. This is evident in the GAO’s damning report, which stated that 
the Merida Initiative has not been at all successful, since the bulk of the 
money allocated to the program has not yet been spent. There also have not 
been concrete evaluations of program success, such as the establishment of 
timelines to facilitate accountability. 
Violence has escalated alarmingly in Mexico and the “spillover” of 
drug violence into the United States is palpable. In discussing the limitations 
of the Merida Initiative, Villiers Negroponte highlights the flow of illegal 
weapons into Mexico from the United States and how this is not adequately 
addressed in the initiative.26 This shortcoming highlights a failure of one of 
the criterion: lessened demand. Illegal weapons trafficking is a direct result 
of the increasing drug trade and turf wars in Mexico. Merida funds cannot 
be used for domestic use, including gun policy; therefore, strengthening 
US domestic policy is essential for foreign drug policy success. An example 
of a program already in place is Project Gunrunner, which was designed to 
stop the flow of illegal weapons from the United States to Mexico. A report 
of US Justice Department’s Inspector General found, however, that Project 
Gunrunner has been largely ineffective due to insufficient communication 
between federal agencies and the inability to target “high-profile” drug 
traffickers.27 The desired outcome of reduced violence in Mexico has clearly 
not been reached.
 The Merida Initiative has also failed to reduce supply. Analysis has 
shown that some US policies have actually increased trafficking. Major 
interdiction efforts on the part of the United States closed Florida as an entry 
point for Colombian cocaine, but left Mexico as an attractive substitute. 
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Small-time Mexican drug dealers reaped the rewards and evolved to 
become the leaders of sophisticated and violent cartels.28 Overall, drug 
demand has remained the same and drug supply has increased. Meyer 
suggests that the Merida Initiative applied the same principles of military-
focused aid to fight drug trafficking, similar to previous unsuccessful 
policies implemented in Mexico by the Mexican government.29 This 
suggests that the program was doomed from the start. On the other hand, 
to abandon a program that has only been partially implemented would be 
a complete waste of funds. As observed in the success of Plan Colombia, 
the length of the program has as much to do with its success as does the 
transition of the program to a nationally run self-sustaining entity.30 
A second policy option is the Obama administration’s strategy of 
following the model of the Merida Initiative, with the inclusion of a more 
bilateral collaborative approach.31 This approach is often referred to as 
“Beyond Merida” and is founded on the “four pillars” first articulated by 
President Obama when he made his FY 2011 budget request. In keeping 
with the “Beyond Merida” rationale of maintaining successful elements 
and changing what does not work, Obama called for refinements of the 
initial program to ensure more widespread success and an expanded 
approach to counterdrug efforts.32 The new approach would be more 
focused on “institution building” than military equipment expenditures—
the bulk of the Merida Initiative’s past spending. The four pillars include: 
1) Disrupting and dismantling criminal organizations by 
viewing them as corporations and disrupting the arms trading 
originating in the United States 
2) Institutionalizing the rule of law by doubling the budget 
allotted for Mexican development of strong institutions 
3) Building a twenty-first century border by changing the 
definition of a border from a simple geographic delineation to 
one of “secure flows.” This would entail moving the location of 
customs and security away from the border to a central city and 
leaving the border as merely a place to “focus on preventing the 
entrance of dangerous illicit flows”33 
4) Building strong and resilient communities through social and 
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economic reforms that range from job creation and neighborhood 
zoning to expanded daycare34 
In her assessment, Villiers Negroponte concludes that while the Merida 
Initiative is a step in the right direction, it is not enough to successfully 
curtail drug trafficking and violence.35 Once the United States’ tenure 
ends, success will be hinged upon the strength of democratic societies’ 
strong governments, their implementation of consistent policies and 
wealth redistribution, supported by long lasting programs with built-
in local support. The “Beyond Merida” approach incorporates the ideas 
outlined by Villiers Negroponte. If successful in the long term, the pillars 
of the “Beyond Merida” approach could affect the supply side of drug 
trafficking. The evolved policy is ambitious in its aims and would require 
a sustained effort on the part of the United States for its success. The policy 
does address weapons trafficking originating in the United States, but has 
not thus far implemented any policy successful in lessening illegal arms 
trading. Unfortunately, the Obama plan is glaringly lacking in its response 
to the call for “shared responsibility” in addressing drug demand.
According to the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the 
prevalence of illicit drugs in the United States will not diminish in the 
near future, but will in fact increase due to growing demand and increased 
production in Mexico. The only drug that will not be produced in increased 
amounts is cocaine, due to shortages felt in Latin America rather than a 
decrease in demand. In fact, global demand has increased as Europe has 
discovered cocaine.36 The NDIC found that, “the growing strength and 
organization of criminal gangs, including their alliances with large Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), will make disrupting illicit drug 
availability and distribution increasingly difficult for law enforcement 
agencies.”37 The Mexican government under President Calderon has fought 
DTOs with some success by limiting internal corruption, but corruption is 
so widespread and the power of the cartels so great that this fight will 
be long. When one cartel leader is arrested, others rise to take his place, 
waging violent battles against each other in cities such as Ciudad Juarez. 
It is estimated that, though thousands of soldiers have been committed by 
President Calderon and millions of US dollars have been given in funding, 
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less than one percent of the billions of dollars in drug money smuggled 
into the United States every year is seized.38 These disheartening statistics 
suggest that the “Beyond Merida” approach has failed the criteria of 
reduced demand leading to lessened supply.  
Unfortunately, drug trafficking and cartel-related violence 
has continued to rise; this raises the question of whether the Obama 
administration's policy has been successful. US officials have claimed that 
drug demand has gone down in the United States and this has increased 
violence in Mexico.39 However, Carnevale found that drug demand has 
in fact remained exactly the same. The three criteria—lessened drug 
production and transportation, violence reduction in Mexico and a 
decreased demand in the United States—have not been met. It is clear that 
the Obama administration’s strategy has not yet been successful. Granted 
that the implementation of a policy of this scope takes time and that the 
intentions of “Beyond Merida” are good, the policy does not account for 
domestic factors influencing the drug trade and does not focus enough on 
the underlying economic and historical issues present in Mexico.
Where should American foreign drug policy go from here? It is 
difficult to decide if the Merida Initiative has been successful, considering 
that it was never fully implemented before the final disbursement of plan 
funds. Should the United States abandon the Merida Initiative completely? 
Has the Merida Initiative really provided enough resources to combat 
the enormity of the drug trafficking trade in Latin America? Should it 
be coupled with the more progressive reforms outlined by the Obama 
administration? Should more aggressive changes in domestic drug policy 
to lower demand be implemented? Is the Merida Initiative’s focus on drug 
trafficking control too narrow for success? Perhaps the answer, in part, lies 
closer to home. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, among others in the Obama 
administration, has stressed the United States’ “shared responsibility” in 
the drug problem facing Mexico. The United States is the biggest customer 
of the cartels that are being fought against, and it is the largest supplier of 
assault weapons to the same Mexican drug cartels. Essentially, the drug 
cartels are fighting the Mexican government with weapons purchased from 
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the United States. The governments of Mexico and the United States are 
battling a highly lucrative industry responsible for employing thousands 
of people and using grizzly scare tactics to intimidate millions of others. 
Unfortunately, current policies do not appear to be effective. A third 
policy option that the Obama administration should consider is using the 
“Beyond Merida” approach as a point of departure. A real commitment 
to drug trafficking eradication must be made through recognition of the 
United States’ role in drug demand and its effects on supply and drug-
related violence. Military assistance to Mexico in a sustained effort is 
necessary to eradicate cartel influence, but as historical outcomes suggest, 
a broader policy focus is imperative for success. Programs implemented in 
Mexico should focus on both local and national sustainability, and funding 
should be consistent for the duration. Plan Colombia was successful in 
some ways because of the sheer quantity of funding by the US government. 
Mexico needs funding so that its programs may be consistent, if nothing 
else. Consistent funding for institution building, military assistance, and 
progressive programming to divert drug producers to other trades would 
all serve to limit the supply of drugs flowing into the United States. 
A paradigm shift will be necessary to lessen violence in Mexico. 
The Obama administration’s approach of collaboration and shared 
responsibility is a welcome departure from that of past administrations, 
but insufficient attention is given by it to the problem of US demand for 
drugs. The United States has five percent of the world’s population, yet it 
has seventeen percent of the world’s drug addicts. US drug policy should 
reflect these numbers. The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) 
reported that the closure of methamphetamine labs in the United States 
has led to significant increases of methamphetamine production in Mexico. 
Rather than a decline in the quantity of methamphetamines, production 
has simple moved to a new location.40 Counterdrug programs must focus 
on and fund drug addiction eradication programs and anti-drug education 
with the zeal demonstrated by counternarcotics military operations in 
order to effectively reduce drug demand and drug violence. This approach 
would meet the criteria of lessening demand and reducing supply in the 
long run; by attacking drug demand, drug supply would be significantly 
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affected over time.
In 2009, the Calderon administration confiscated approximately 
34,000 weapons, most of which originated in the United States.41 These 
were not handguns, but assault weapons such as AK-47s. This suggests that 
the availability of assault weapons in the United States is a major factor in 
drug violence. The Obama administration should address the 2004 Assault 
Weapons Ban reversal and take steps through legislation to reinstate the ban. 
If reversing the ban is not possible, increased oversight and strengthened 
enforcement of current laws is necessary; this would mean regulating gun 
show sales and increasing border security and crackdowns on illegal arms 
traders in the United States. Violence in Mexico would most certainly be 
reduced if access to assault and automatic weapons was decreased. Almost 
daily, the Los Angeles Times features stories of mass shootings in cartel-run 
border cities. Without easy access to automatic weapons, gun violence 
would decrease.
Lastly, many economists and knowledgeable leaders suggest that 
legalizing certain drugs would be a means of driving their prices down. 
Without the high price tags attached to illicit drugs, the high-stakes drug 
wars would most certainly diminish. Simple economic theory explains that 
high prices stimulate highly competitive markets, but low prices are less 
attractive and lessen suppliers. Drug legalization is hotly contested and 
conflicting information suggests that legalizing drugs, such as marijuana, 
will produce few changes in Mexico’s illicit drug trade and related 
violence.42 Klimer suggests that marijuana sales make up only part of drug 
trafficking profits with estimates of between $1.5 and $2 billion in annual 
gross revenue.43 However, while Klimer also maintains that it is unknown 
whether reductions in Mexican DTOs’ revenues from exporting marijuana 
would lead to corresponding decreases in violence, other analysts have 
suggested that large reductions in revenues could increase violence in the 
short run but decrease it in the long run.44 Therefore, the legalization of 
certain drugs and the establishment of government price controls could 
diminish the surges of violence in Mexico and would satisfy, in part, all 
three of the criteria established. 
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concluSion
The Merida Initiative has had some positive impacts: it opened dialogue 
between the United States and Mexico and improved relations that had 
been cooling for years. President Calderon was the first foreign president to 
visit the United States after President Obama took office, marking a turning 
point in diplomatic relations between the countries, and suggesting that 
closer collaboration would continue. 
The drug-trafficking problem in Mexico is enormous. It would be 
impossible to eradicate a problem of this magnitude quickly. Massive surges 
of violence unquelled by government intervention have accompanied the 
increasing lawlessness associated with drug trafficking. This has been 
evident in the apparent failures of both Mexican and American drug 
policies for Mexico. This paper has outlined the complexity of foreign drug 
policy for the United States and the enormity of the problem for Mexico. 
After assessing the three policies using the established criteria, the third 
policy emerges as the best course of action for Mexico: the United States 
should proceed with the “Beyond Merida” approach, while focusing on 
domestic US factors that influence the drug trade. 
“Beyond Merida” should be used as a framework for a more 
progressive policy that will incorporate a sustained, long term commitment 
to aid Mexico in its anti-drug efforts. To truly eradicate the rampant supply 
of drugs and the ever-growing drug trafficking trade, the United States and 
Mexico must cooperate and the United States must commit to implementing 
aid programs properly. As GAO reports have shown, accountability has 
proven difficult for the State Department. To truly affect the both supply 
and demand sides of the drug problem, policies must be implemented 
properly, with measures in place to ensure success and cohesion. US-
led programs should focus on local and national sustainability to ensure 
lasting impacts.
A military-centered aid approach is not working. Plan Colombia 
showed that the United States could eradicate cartel influence in one 
country, but that the drug trade would merely shift to a new country. 
Historically, Mexican presidents have fought organized crime and drug 
trafficking through “combating fire with more fire” with little success.45 
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Clearly, a new approach is necessary. Mexico’s Supreme Agricultural 
Court estimates that approximately thirty percent of Mexico’s cultivatable 
land is used for drug production.46 To truly eradicate the drug supply 
problem, not only must drug demand be curbed, but a commitment from 
the United States and Mexico is necessary to retrain those involved in the 
drug industry to produce different goods, and social reforms are necessary 
to support the impoverished.
Thomas Cole argues that the killings in Mexico and movements in 
the US market for drugs are correlated.47 Drug policy analyst Mark Kleiman 
agrees that Mexico’s position as the primary transit point for illegal drugs 
entering the United States is directly linked to US demand. If demand rises, 
drug violence will rise as well. Kleiman notes that the heaviest drug users 
are responsible for the largest portion of demand and says that, “taking 
away the drug dealers’ best customers will reduce their earnings.”48 
Effective intervention targeted at these drug users is necessary to affect 
the illegal drug economy. The prevention of future substance abuse could 
also help shrink the illicit drug market, thereby reducing the stakes for 
DTO profits that motivates violence.49 Another option to consider is the 
legalization of certain drugs, something that has been advocated for by 
the United Nation’s Committee for Crime and Drugs and many political 
leaders.
Much of Mexico’s violence is due to the use of automatic weapons, 
most of which come from the United States. Heavily armed cartels wage wars 
against one another with catastrophic results, not only killing each another, 
but more often than not murdering innocent bystanders. To eradicate illegal 
weapons transfers, Villiers Negroponte asserts that a two-pronged assault 
is necessary.50 Not only is it necessary to curtail “downstream” sales to 
criminal organizations, but to successfully reduce weapons trafficking and 
availability of arms to Mexican criminal organizations, “upstream” sales in 
the United States must be further regulated through the implementation 
of stricter rules dealing with gun shows, gun dealers and illicit private 
sales. Villiers Negroponte calls for an effective assault weapons ban, which 
will, “first seek to ban the import of lethal weapons, including assault 
weapons, and second to end the grandfathering of weapons in excess 
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of .50 caliber.”51 The United States must recognize that its gun policies 
and lackluster enforcement directly relate to the increased violence and 
instability in Mexico and must strive to curb this alarming trend. The first 
step that Obama administration should take is addressing the 2004 Assault 
Weapons Ban reversal. The administration should work to reinstate the ban 
and heighten oversight and regulation of gun shows and illegal traders.
President Calderon has shown an admirable dedication to 
eliminating drug cartels and corruption in Mexico. The United States and 
Mexico have a unique relationship stemming from a shared history and 
similar ideological and political views. Both countries are democracies and 
were founded on similar principles. If Calderon continues his undertaking, 
and the United States continues to support him while focusing more on 
domestic drug and weapons policy and enforcement, it will be possible 
to diminish the cartel stranglehold on Mexico and lessen its widespread 
violence.
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